Pakistan and China are seeking to push the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor beyond its traditional focus on roads, ports and power plants towards artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure, advanced manufacturing and greener industry, a shift that could determine whether CPEC 2.0 develops into an engine of technological capacity or leaves Pakistan dependent on imported technologies.
The change in emphasis comes as the two countries reaffirm their strategic partnership. Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Senator Ishaq Dar held talks with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Shanghai on the sidelines of the World Artificial Intelligence Conference, where they discussed expanding cooperation in emerging technologies, including AI. Both sides stressed the importance of high-quality development under CPEC 2.0 and greater collaboration in trade, investment, science and technology, the digital economy and artificial intelligence. They also exchanged views on regional and global developments and pledged continued coordination on matters of mutual interest.
The emphasis reflects a broader reorientation of CPEC. Its first phase concentrated on arterial roads, deep-sea port facilities and large-scale power generation. The second is increasingly expected to encompass data architecture, artificial intelligence, digital connectivity, research and technological capability, alongside a move from predominantly government-to-government projects towards greater business-to-business engagement.
Five strategic corridors - growth, livelihood, innovation, green development and regional connectivity - have emerged as part of CPEC 2.0. Among them, the digital component is being presented as potentially particularly consequential because modern industrial competitiveness increasingly depends on cloud infrastructure, cybersecurity, intelligent logistics, fintech and innovation-driven manufacturing as well as conventional physical infrastructure. Recent engagement with Chinese technology companies has reinforced this direction. High-level meetings at Alibaba Group's headquarters and memorandums of understanding covering artificial intelligence, financial technology, health human-capital technology and digital education have been cited as evidence of a prospective shift towards deeper technological and knowledge-based cooperation.
Some foundations already exist. Chinese companies have contributed to Pakistan's fibre-optic infrastructure, telecommunications networks, e-commerce ecosystems, fintech platforms and digital surveillance technologies. The cross-border fibre-optic cable through the Khunjerab Pass was an early example of digital connectivity associated with CPEC, though such initiatives have remained fragmented rather than forming part of a coherent national innovation strategy. The proposed next step is an integrated ecosystem linking universities, technology parks, start-up incubators, industrial zones and research institutions. With nearly two-thirds of Pakistan's population under 30, the argument is that digital skills, innovation capacity and technological absorption will be necessary if this demographic profile is to translate into participation in the global digital economy. That makes technology transfer a central question. Pakistan has historically imported industrial hardware and systems without developing sufficient domestic innovation capacity alongside them. Under the proposed approach, digital cooperation would place greater emphasis on technology transfer, digital industrialisation and indigenous innovation.
Joint ventures in semiconductor assembly, artificial-intelligence applications, cloud computing, battery technology and smart manufacturing have been identified as potential areas in which workforce development, university cooperation and local research could be incorporated. Without such arrangements, Pakistan risks remaining primarily a consumer of imported technology rather than becoming a participant in global value chains. Special Economic Zones are another target for change. The uneven performance of some zones during CPEC's first phase has been cited as evidence that physical infrastructure alone cannot ensure industrial investment. A proposed model for the next generation would turn SEZs into smart industrial clusters equipped with automation, digital logistics, high-speed connectivity, research incubation and AI-enabled manufacturing support.
Technology parks connected to universities in Lahore, Karachi, Islamabad, Peshawar and Gwadar could serve as nodes linking regional innovation systems with Chinese businesses and international supply chains. Green industrialisation forms another strand. Battery manufacturing has been identified as a potentially important industry as electric mobility expands globally. Pakistan is described as possessing elements of the industrial base, mineral resources and energy infrastructure that could eventually allow it to enter parts of the battery and electric-vehicle supply chain, drawing on Chinese expertise.
Such development could increase green exports, reduce reliance on imported petroleum and improve industrial productivity, while connecting CPEC infrastructure with higher-value activity across manufacturing, transport, agriculture and energy. Digital technology is also being linked to climate resilience. Precision agriculture, flood forecasting, satellite-based mapping and AI-assisted disaster management are identified as tools that could strengthen economic resilience, with predictive technology and integrated data systems increasingly important alongside conventional physical infrastructure. The evolution of CPEC is taking place alongside a wider change in China's Belt and Road Initiative. The initiative is described as shifting away from an overriding emphasis on the speed of expansion towards resilience, supply-chain security and a longer-term strategy suited to a more fragmented geopolitical and economic environment.
Jilin Province in northeastern China is being presented as one possible model for Pakistan. Its economy grew by 4.5% year on year in the first quarter, reaching 334.74 billion yuan. Services contributed more than 70% of the expansion, while the province's economic composition consisted of 5.1% primary industry, 29.2% secondary industry and 65.7% tertiary activity. Its experience is relevant particularly because global connectivity has been combined with domestic industrial upgrading. Jilin has used Belt and Road links to support logistics while modernising legacy state-owned enterprises and developing local economic activity.
The logistics comparison extends to Gwadar and Balochistan. Jilin's freight network connects its industrial base with European manufacturing centres, while an international airport and inland rail port have helped turn Changchun into a transit hub. One proposal contained in the material is to pair Gwadar's deep-sea facilities with a dry port in Karachi through an integrated rail transport system. Jilin has also secured access to Russia's Vladivostok as a cross-border transit port for domestic trade, effectively providing a landlocked Chinese province with more economical access to the sea. Its experience is cited as an illustration of how development diplomacy and cross-border arrangements can alter logistical constraints.
The province is simultaneously pushing into greener industries. By the end of 2025, new and renewable energy capacity stood at 33.90 million kilowatts, equivalent to 65.8% of its total power capacity. Its plans envisage 70 million kW of new-energy capacity by 2030, alongside zero-carbon industrial parks and expanded production of green hydrogen, ammonia and methanol. For Pakistan, the suggested lesson is not simply to reproduce individual Chinese projects. It is to combine logistics, industrial clusters, supply chains and local manufacturing under CPEC 2.0, while diversifying routes towards Iran, Central Asia and maritime markets. A "Made in Pakistan" industrial policy and corridor-linked manufacturing clusters are proposed as ways of capturing more economic value from connectivity.
The challenge is therefore becoming less about how much infrastructure CPEC builds and more about what Pakistan can do with it. Roads, ports and electricity formed the physical foundations of the first phase; the ambitions attached to the second encompass technology transfer, artificial intelligence, digital industry, research and greener manufacturing.
Whether that transition succeeds will depend, according to the material, on Pakistan's ability to absorb and commercialise technology rather than merely import it. On that measure, the significance of CPEC 2.0 may ultimately be judged not by the quantity of infrastructure constructed, but by whether it enables the country to become more technologically sophisticated, export-oriented and innovation-driven.