Pakistan and China have shifted their attention from building to protecting the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). On September 16th and 17th, the two countries held the first meeting of their Boundary Joint Commission in Islamabad. The body was created under a 2013 border-management agreement but had never been put into operation. Its talks covered border control, joint surveys, the movement of goods and people, trade facilitation and connectivity. At the same time, border forces from both countries carried out a joint patrol at the Mintaka Pass near Khunjerab, about 4,700 metres above sea level, following a similar exercise at Khunjerab in May. The timing is significant: with shipping disrupted in the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea, secure overland routes have become strategically more valuable.
The emphasis on security reflects years of pressure from Beijing. When Xi Jinping met Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif in September 2025, he said the next phase of the corridor would require a safe environment for Chinese workers, projects and institutions. In a joint statement issued in May 2026, Pakistan promised further protection for Chinese personnel and projects, and China offered closer cooperation on security and counter-terrorism under its Global Security Initiative. A Lahore-based commentator argues that the project’s success depends on peace even more than on roads or ports.
Afghanistan remains the main uncertainty. Tensions with Kabul eased in September, but Islamabad continues to insist that Afghan territory must not be used for attacks on Pakistan. On September 17th, the Foreign Office said Afghan cooperation could lead to reopened borders, restored trade and a role for Afghanistan as a regional connectivity hub. If that happens, Gwadar, Khunjerab and the overland routes between them could become part of a much wider trade network.
Officials have also been working on the corridor’s economic agenda. The 91st CPEC review meeting, held in August, discussed accelerating work on five corridors: growth, livelihood, innovation, green development and regional connectivity. The 92nd, held on August 31st, focused on linking the second phase with industry, agriculture, minerals, technology, human resources and business-to-business ties. During Mr Sharif’s visit to China in May, the two sides agreed to develop Gwadar into a regional hub, strengthen overland links through Khunjerab and upgrade important sections of the Karakoram Highway in stages.
The broader geopolitical context has raised the stakes. Oil rose above $100 a barrel in September as disruption in Hormuz and other shipping lanes increased fears about trade and inflation. On September 16th, China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, met his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi, in Beijing and called on America and Iran to reduce tensions, resume talks and reopen the strait. The next day he spoke to Marco Rubio, America’s secretary of state. Commentators argue that this shows China’s interests now extend well beyond East Asia, and that Pakistan’s location between these competing powers makes it increasingly important.
Supporters of the corridor point to the results of its first phase, which they say transformed Pakistan’s power sector and transport network. According to one advocate, the 1,320MW Sahiwal coal plant in Punjab, built for $1.8bn, supplies more than 4m families, and the 720MW Karot project serves over 5m. Lahore’s 27km Orange Line metro has carried more than 280m passengers in five years. The 886km Matiari-Lahore transmission line can carry 4,000MW and serves 10m households. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the 884MW Suki Kinari hydropower plant cost $1.8bn, the upgraded Havelian-Thakot section of the Karakoram Highway covers 118km in two hours, and the 1,000-acre Rashakai special economic zone houses 27 businesses.
Sindh has received some of the largest projects. These include the K-2 and K-3 nuclear plants with a combined 2,200MW, two 1,320MW coal plants in Thar, and wind farms at Dawood and Sachal of 49.5MW each. The Sukkur-Multan motorway has reduced travel time between the two cities from 11 hours to four. In Balochistan, where the projects are expected to have the greatest local impact, the China-Pakistan Friendship Hospital in Gwadar has treated more than 350,000 patients. A desalination plant there produces up to 3,000 tonnes of fresh water a day, a vocational institute has provided over 3,000 training places, and Chinese donors have supplied more than 15,000 household solar panels.
Not everyone accepts this favourable account. Critics, including Shabbar Zaidi, a former chairman of the Federal Board of Revenue, have questioned the corridor’s debts, the viability of its projects and the terms of its agreements. Supporters dismiss these criticisms as selective and misleading. They point out that China is Pakistan’s largest trading partner and biggest source of foreign direct investment, and that opinion polls show strong public support for the relationship. In September China marked the 77th anniversary of the People’s Republic, and the two countries have now had diplomatic relations for 75 years, which partly explains why the debate is so heated.
The second phase is meant to rely less on physical infrastructure and more on technology. Planners describe a “digital corridor” built on 5G, fibre-optic networks, China’s BeiDou satellite-navigation system, locally hosted AI cloud services and domestic data centres, which would keep the value of Pakistani data inside the country. Proposed applications include drones and robotic harvesting in agriculture, automation in mining and robotic surgery and telemedicine in healthcare. Advocates say special economic zones could skip intermediate stages of industrial development by moving straight to automated manufacturing.
These plans depend heavily on Pakistan’s young population: 63% of Pakistanis are under 30. The programme aims to train 1m people outside the IT sector in digital skills and to fund doctoral research in quantum computing and robotics. Its supporters argue that without such specialists, technology transferred from China would remain something Pakistanis use but cannot develop themselves. Instead of taking on industries China is abandoning, Pakistan hopes to join supply chains in China’s newer sectors, such as artificial intelligence, robotics and green technology.
Cultural ties are also expanding. Mandarin is taught at the National University of Modern Languages, the University of the Punjab and several Confucius Institutes, and the number of Pakistani learners is rising. Chinese universities have opened Pakistan study centres and Urdu courses, and literary works are being translated in both directions. In 2025 the two governments discussed expanding exchanges between journalists and content creators and distributing more Chinese material in English and Urdu. Proponents now want joint digital platforms in three languages, more scholarships, tourism along the old Silk Road and more funding for film, animation and publishing.
The corridor has clear ambitions, but it still faces serious obstacles. Gwadar has not yet reached full commercial use, overland links remain incomplete, and investors want firmer guarantees of security. As one commentator puts it, the main question is not how much China invests but whether Pakistan has the seriousness and internal stability to turn its location into economic strength. The new border commission is a modest start, and its success will depend on whether peace holds on the Afghan frontier.